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MY BROTHER’S KEEPER: USING THE FOREIGN INT
ELLIGENCE TOOLBOX ON DOMESTIC TERRORISM
Brandon Carmack
“It is impossible to expel evil from the world in its entirety, but it is
possible to constrict it within each person.” – Alexander Solzhenitsyn
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I. INTRODUCTION
I remember the morning of April 19, 1995. I was seven years old and
confused by the rubble that consistently flashed across my television.
Words like “Oklahoma City Bombing” hung in the air, and Timothy
McVeigh became synonymous with evil. I remember the morning of
September 11, 2001. I was thirteen years old and confused by the rubble
that consistently flashed across my television. Words like “9/11” hung in
the air, and Osama Bin Laden became synonymous with evil.
Recent decades have forced the intelligence community to monitor
pendulum shifts in various expressions of terrorism. The early nineties
raised questions about foreign terrorism as Al-Qaeda took responsibility
for attempted bombings at the World Trade Center. The mid-nineties
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raised questions of domestic terrorism with the Oklahoma City Bombing.
The pendulum returned to foreign terrorism after Al-Qaeda attacked U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and, of course, the World
Trade Center in 2001.
However, in the last five years, the pendulum of concern has once
again swung to domestic terrorism. 1 Mass shootings dominate the news
cycle. Each violent episode gives rise to riveting discussions concerning
gun violence in the United States. But rarely do these discussions consider
how the United States’ current law enforcement infrastructure could be
used to identify and prevent such tragedies.
Recent testimony to the House Homeland Security Committee
indicates an increase in domestic terrorism incidents in recent years. 2 In
2013, Americans suffered twenty domestic terrorism incidents. 3 In 2014,
that number grew to twenty-nine. 4 A smaller uptick occurred in 2015,
reaching thirty-eight incidents. 5 But by 2016, that number nearly doubled
See Adam Goldman, F.B.I., Pushing to Stop Domestic Terrorists, Grapples with Limits on
Its Power, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/us/politics/fbi-

1

domestic-terrorism.html [https://perma.cc/Y92Q-WLJT]. “The increase in [domestic
terrorism] arrests marks something of a return to the 1990s, when the F.B.I. devoted
significant resources to infiltrating and dismantling violent white supremacist and right-wing
militia organizations from which lethal terrorists like David Lane and Timothy McVeigh
emerged.” Id.
See Michael C. McGarrity, Confronting the Rise of Domestic Terrorism in the Homeland,
FBI (May 8, 2019), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/confronting-the-rise-of-domesticterrorism-in-the-homeland [https://perma.cc/NR49-SMEH] (Statement Before the House
Homeland Security Committee) (“We believe domestic terrorists pose a present and
persistent threat of violence and economic harm to the United States; in fact, there have been
more arrests and deaths caused by domestic terrorists than international terrorists in recent
years.”).
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2013 Results,
UNIV.
OF
MD.
GLOBAL
TERRORISM
DATABASE,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=1&casualties_type=b&casualties_
max=&start_year=2013&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2013&end_month=12&en
d_day=31&dtp2=all&country=217&expanded=no&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GT
DID&od=desc#results-table [https://perma.cc/YL29-5S7S].
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2014 Results,
UNIV.
OF
MD.
GLOBAL
TERRORISM
DATABASE,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=1&casualties_type=b&casualties_
max=&start_year=2014&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2014&end_month=12&en
d_day=31&dtp2=all&country=217&expanded=no&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GT
DID&od=desc#results-table [https://perma.cc/6Z3H-RH2K].
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2015 Results,
UNIV.
OF
MD.
GLOBAL
TERRORISM
DATABASE,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=2&casualties_type=b&casualties_
2

3

4

5
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to sixty-seven. 6 In 2017 and 2018, that number stayed nearly the same—
sixty-six 7 and sixty-seven, respectively. 8
As a result of the alarming rise in domestic terrorism, we must ask
whether the Constitution provides room for more government action
against it. Policy leaders should begin by looking at various tools available
to the foreign intelligence community to determine what might be legally
permissible and practical in a domestic context. Obviously, not all foreign
tools would be permissible for domestic use. For example, drone strikes
on U.S. soil would violate constitutional due process (though the Justice
Department has permitted drone strikes against U.S. citizens on foreign
soil). 9 But what about material support statutes or enhanced interrogation
techniques? Each tool in the foreign intelligence community must
maintain an independent legal basis for domestic application. This paper
evaluates the constitutional limits of employing foreign surveillance
techniques against domestic terrorism suspects.
The Constitution shields the American citizen much differently than
a foreign enemy combatant. Coupled with rapidly evolving technology, the
prospect of enhanced government surveillance should cause discomfort
max=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&en
d_day=31&dtp2=all&country=217&expanded=no&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GT
DID&od=desc#results-table [https://perma.cc/JWT6-RJAT].
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2016 Results,
UNIV.
OF
MD.
GLOBAL
TERRORISM
DATABASE,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?expanded=no&casualties_type=b&casua
lties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=1
2&end_day=31&dtp2=all&success=yes&country=217&ob=GTDID&od=desc&page=1&cou
nt=20#results-table [https://perma.cc/7D7S-TESW].
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2017 Results,
UNIV.
OF
MD.
GLOBAL
TERRORISM
DATABASE,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_y
ear=2017&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2017&end_month=12&end_day=31&as
mSelect0=&country=217&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualtie
s_max= [https://perma.cc/2RLJ-6AU6].
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2018 Results,
UNIV.
OF
MD.
GLOBAL
TERRORISM
DATABASE,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_y
ear=2018&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2018&end_month=12&end_day=31&as
mSelect0=&country=217&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualtie
s_max= [https://perma.cc/AA85-N7UF].
See OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAWS AND THE CONSTITUTION TO CONTEMPLATED LETHAL OPERATIONS
AGAINST
SHAYKH
ANWAR
AL-AULAQI
(July
16,
2010),
https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/aulaqi.pdf [https://perma.cc/385F-WX3G].
6

7

8

9
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and resistance. Americans have rightly favored their freedom over their
security since the days of the American Revolution. But what if we could
be slightly more secure without sacrificing freedoms? Is this possible?
This paper argues that it is possible to strike such a balance. Section
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) already provides
the structure for constitutionally enhancing surveillance against domestic
terrorism suspects. 10 However, while this proposal falls within the
boundaries of the Constitution, political concerns likely prevent its
adoption. Part II of this article provides an overview of Section 702 and
outlines the proposed language for its domestic counterpart. Part III then
analyzes the constitutional limits on that proposal. Finally, this article
identifies and addresses the political limitations that likely prevent this
reform in Part IV.
By way of preface, I do not argue that adopting Section 702 into the
domestic context will solve the problem of domestic terrorism. Indeed,
even if passed, its implementation would face significant practical
challenges for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Rather, the goal
of this paper is to encourage the intelligence community to consider
whether foreign intelligence tools are appropriate for combating domestic
terrorism. It may be that federal criminal statutes already provide the
needed tools to address the pendulum's return to domestic terror. Be that
as it may, the goal of this proposal is more than mere navel-gazing—I
simply hope to inspire a fresh conversation on what our Constitution
allows, despite our political reservations.
II. DOMESTICATING SECTION 702: A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
In December of 2018, Dakota Reed adorned his Seattle bedroom
with white supremacist propaganda. 11 With this as a backdrop, Reed
recorded himself holding two AR-15’s while announcing he was “fixing to
shoot up” a local school. 12 He posted this video on Facebook. Only a
month prior, Reed wrote on his Facebook wall that he was “shooting for

See generally The FISA Amendments Act: Q&A, OFF. OF DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE
(Apr.
18,
2017),
https://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/FISA%20Amendments%20Act%20QA%20for%20Publicati
on.pdf [https://perma.cc/THW4-LNRV]; see also Section 702 Overview, OFF. OF DIR. OF
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, https://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/Section702-Basics-Infographic.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S5HV-582L].
Goldman, supra note 1.
10

11
12

Id.
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30 Jews.” 13 The FBI investigated Reed. Finding the threat too vague, they
passed his case off to local law enforcement. 14 Reed pled guilty to making
bomb threats and served a one-year sentence. 15
According to the New York Times, Reed’s case highlights typical
limits on the FBI’s domestic terrorism efforts: “Agents cannot always rely
on federal law, unlike in so-called international terrorism cases where
statutes were enacted to address the threat after the 9/11 attacks. Instead,
the FBI often turns to local prosecutors to charge people they are
concerned might be planning domestic attacks.” 16 The proposal outlined
in this paper can close one of these gaps in federal law. Using FISA’s
Section 702 model, Congress could pass legislation allowing the FBI to
target potential domestic terrorists that trigger an Artificial Intelligence (AI)
system integrated on social media platforms. The AI system would be built
on already-existing FBI behavioral analytics. Once a suspect triggers this
system, the FBI would have a legal basis to engage in upstream and
selector surveillance of that individual.

A. Section 702—A Foreign-Target Surveillance Tool
Due to FISA’s clandestine nature, significant confusion and
speculation exist around it. Section 702 provides no exception. The
following section briefly summarizes Section 702 and the debate
surrounding the scope of the FBI’s access (the “Backdoor Loophole”).
In the FISA Amendments Acts of 2008, Congress added Section 702
to authorize “sweeping and suspicionless programmatic surveillance
targeting individuals outside the United States.” 17 In essence, Section 702
gave the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) oversight over “the
surveillance, for foreign intelligence purposes, of foreigners overseas.” 18

13
14
15
16

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (“‘Law enforcement needs more effective tools,’ said Mary McCord, a former top

national security prosecutor who has drafted a proposed statute to criminalize the stockpiling
of weapons intended to be used in a domestic terrorist attack. ‘I recognize the very legitimate
concerns of those in the civil rights community, but I would hope that their concerns could
be addressed through oversight.’”).
STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., COUNTERTERRORISM LAW 305 (Rachel Barkow et al. eds., 3d ed.
2016).
Id. at 306.

17

18
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Specifically, Section 702 affords the intelligence community two
surveillance tools: “PRISM” and “upstream” data collection. 19 First,
PRISM collection allows the government to send a “selector” (e.g., an
email address) to an electronic communications service provider in the
United States (i.e., an Internet Service Provider (ISP)). 20 Section 702
compels the ISP to provide the National Security Agency (NSA) with all
communication from that email address (or whatever selector the agency
chose). 21 PRISM only involves electronic communications—not telephone
calls. 22 While the NSA receives all communications collected through
PRISM, it shares only limited portions of that information with the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and FBI. 23 Second, Section 702 provides
“upstream” data collection. Upstream differs from PRISM collection in
multiple ways: (1) upstream compels assistance from providers controlling
the “‘backbone’ over which . . . internet communications transit” rather
than just the cooperation of ISP’s; 24 (2) upstream collection includes
telephone communications and electronic communications; 25 and (3) only
the NSA receives upstream communications. 26
In 2017, Congress limited upstream searches. 27 For example, Section
702 originally permitted “about” communications, whereby the NSA can
collect communications including a selector of a targeted person. This
means that when the NSA targets a selector, it can obtain any
communications discussing that selector, rather than just communication
“to” or “from” that selector. 28 However, Congress revised this provision in
DAVID MEDINE ET AL., PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 7 (2014).
19

THE
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Emma Kohse, Summary: The FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017,

LAWFARE (Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/summary-fisa-amendmentsreauthorization-act-2017 [https://perma.cc/A4BT-TPAN].
See Andrew Crocker & David Ruiz, How Congress's Extension of Section 702 May Expand
the NSA's Warrantless Surveillance Authority, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/02/how-congresss-extension-section-702-may-expandnsas-warrantless-surveillance [https://perma.cc/ZK87-N5J6] (“Under downstream, the
government requires companies like Google, Facebook, and Yahoo to turn over messages
‘to’ and ‘from’ a selector—gaining access to things like emails and Facebook messages.”).
28
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the 2017 renewal. 29 That revision terminated the “about” communications
searches unless the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and Attorney
General (AG) provide Congress with a thirty-day notice to renew the
program. 30 Section 702 also permits “multiple communications
transactions.” 31 This allows the NSA to collect any communications
included in a thread “to,” “from,” or “about,” the selector, so long as one
end of the communications transaction involves a non-U.S. foreign
individual. 32
However, Congress placed various limitations on Section 702. First,
Section 702 prohibits the intentional targeting of “United States persons.” 33
Of relevance here, the amendment proscribes surveillance of “any
communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are
known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States.” 34
In other words, Section 702 only permits targeted surveillance of non-U.S.
citizens.
Second, by its very placement in FISA, Section 702 remains subject
to FISC review. Importantly, the FISC reviews the minimization
procedures for the inadvertent collection of U.S. persons and any
retention or dissemination procedures regarding that data. 35 Additionally,
the FISC ensures all surveillance procedures comply with both Section
702 and the Fourth Amendment. 36

29
30

See id.
Id. (In 2017, Congress expressly terminated the “about communications” practice when it

voted to reinstate Section 702).
MEDINE ET AL., supra note 19, at 7.
31
32

Id.

50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1)–(5) (2018); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (2018) (defining a “United
States person” as “a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence (as defined in section 1101(a)(20) of Title 8), an unincorporated association a
substantial number of members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the United
States, but does not include a corporation or an association which is a foreign power, as
defined in subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3) [of this section].”).
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d) (2018).
See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 17, at 306.
See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 793 (2015) (citing 50 U.S.C. §
1803) (“[T]he Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”) . . . established a
special court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”), to review the
government's applications for orders permitting electronic surveillance.”).
33

34
35
36
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B. The “Backdoor Loophole”—Section 702’s Current Domestic Use
The Backdoor Loophole matters to the analysis because it
demonstrates how confusion over processes can lead to erroneous
conclusions of law. Clarifying these clandestine practices provides a subtle,
yet important step to providing the FBI with necessary tools against
domestic terrorism.
Critics misunderstand the FBI’s access to Section 702 information
and argue that Section 702’s drafters “overlooked how law enforcement
uses intelligence information.” 37 Specifically, critics allege that FBI officials
examine Section 702 databases using “‘U.S. person identifiers’ (terms or
indicators that are linked to a U.S. person),” arguing “[n]o search warrant
is required to query such information.” 38 Additionally, critics argue that,
although Section 702 “imposes a low level of judicial scrutiny for the
creation of the large pools of information in 702 databases,” there is no
higher scrutiny for such targeted intrusion on that person’s “heightened
privacy interest.” 39 Thus, critics conclude that “[w]hile the standards for
querying Section 702 data are well-suited for foreign intelligence purposes,
they are woefully inadequate for law enforcement purposes.” 40 However,
these arguments confuse how FBI queries occur, and provide a limited
presentation of the implicated law.
Former FBI special agent Asha Rangappa has outlined two
clarifications for how these queries occur. First, in 2011, the FBI
developed the Data Integration and Visualization System (DIVS), which
aggregates data from multiple government databases. 41 Scholars suggest
DIVS resulted from the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation that the
intelligence community unify “their knowledge in a network-based
information sharing system that transcends traditional government
boundaries.” 42

Mieke Eoyang & Gary Ashcroft, Why Electronic Surveillance Reform is Necessary, THIRD
WAY (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.thirdway.org/memo/why-electronic-surveillance-reformis-necessary [https://perma.cc/QF8Z-4QGP].
37

38
39
40

Id.
Id.
Id.

Asha Rangappa, Don’t Fall for the Hype: How the FBI’s Use of Section 702 Surveillance
Really
Works,
JUST
SECURITY
(Nov.
29,
2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/47428/dont-fall-hype-702-fbi-works [https://perma.cc/EL5Q8SP2].
41

Data
42

Id.
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Second, some of the Section 702 PRISM data is provided to the FBI
through DIVS, comingled with all the data in DIVS. 43 Section 702 data is
explained as “‘federated’ within DIVS”: 44
This means that while a query may return a 702
“hit”—i.e., an indication that FISA-related information
related to the queried selector exists—neither the metadata
nor the content of that communication is immediately
accessible to all agents. Only agents who work national
security cases, have gone through FISA training, and have
the appropriate clearance levels may continue to access the
full 702 data at this stage. Agents working “ordinary”
criminal cases, who do not have this training and clearance,
would need to have an agent with the appropriate FISA
clearance access the 702 data, and only after obtaining
approval from both her own supervisor and the national
security agent’s supervisor to rerun the query. 45
Proponents of the Backdoor Loophole draw two important
conclusions from this system. First, agents are not able to conduct Section
702-only searches: “[T]here is no such thing as doing an independent,
702-only ‘search,’ even just for surface connections between non-content
selectors, or ‘metadata.’” 46 Second, when the agent conducts the query,
“she does not know whether or not the search will result in a 702 ‘hit.’” 47
Based on the foregoing, proponents argue that reform efforts requiring the
FBI to show “relevance” for a “metadata query” fail to recognize there is
“no such thing as a ‘metadata query.’” 48 Thus, “[t]his policy would require
the FBI to go to court for every single search its 14,000 agents conduct
each day.” 49 In daily practice, DIVS only returns data appropriate for the
clearance level and need-to-know basis of the individual conducting the
search. This screening process is automated according to the classified
nature of the data and security clearance credentials associated with an
agent’s profile.

43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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C. The Proposal
Section 702 provides a framework for advanced, constitutional
surveillance of domestic terrorism. As a prevention tool, Section 702
could provide the FBI with needed intelligence to intercept violent
domestic acts before they occur. Specifically, Section 702 contains four
fundamental categories that could be mirrored into the domestic realm: (a)
targeted surveillance; (b) private sector participation; (c) limited timeframe;
and (d) judicial oversight over targeting and mitigation procedures. 50 These
elements could be used to build a domestic terrorism prevention statute
that complies with constitutional limits on surveillance.

1. Targeted Surveillance
Section 702 authorizes the AG and DNI to “target[] persons
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire
foreign intelligence information.” 51 Such targeting is limited to non-U.S.
persons located outside of the United States and cannot be used to gain
information about either a U.S. person or any person located inside the
U.S. 52 Section 702(b) is controversial because the electronic
communications of U.S. persons are still being acquired inadvertently if
such U.S. persons communicate with a foreign target under surveillance. 53
50 U.S.C §§ 1881a(b)(1)–(3) (2018) (discussing targeted surveillance); 1881a(h)(2)(A)(vi)
(outlining private sector participation); 1881a(a) (explaining limited time frame);
1881a(d)(2)–(e) (providing judicial review and minimization procedures).
Foreign Intelligence Amendments Act of 2008, 50 U.S.C § 1881a(a) (2008).
§ 1881a(b)(1)–(4).
See Robyn Greene, Unintentional Noncompliance and the Need for Section 702 Reform,
LAWFARE (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/unintentional-noncompliance-andneed-section-702-reform [https://perma.cc/7UHT-QJKE] (“This most recent query
violation is part of a long history of inadvertent improper searches of Section 702-acquired
data for U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons’ communications alike.”). But see Shreve Ariail,
The High Stakes of Misunderstanding Section 702 Reforms, LAWFARE (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/high-stakes-misunderstanding-section-702-reforms
[https://perma.cc/P9V7-YTGW]. Ariail states:
To the extent that anyone might suggest that the law on incidental interception is “unsettled”
(which it is not) it is also worth considering, as Judge Gleeson did in United States v.
Hasbajrami the Supreme Court’s ruling in this area . . . . Other courts to address the
incidental interception issue in other contexts have found similarly and no meaningful
distinction between the constitutionality of incidental interception under the Section 702
program and incidental interception through other lawful surveillance has been identified.
50

51
52
53

Id.
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Similarly, Congress should pass language, with limitations, providing
the FBI with targeting tools for U.S. persons likely to engage in domestic
terrorism. As under FISA, no U.S. person should be targeted, “solely
upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment.” 54 However,
if it is possible to protect the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens while at
the same time protecting their lives, should we not strive for such a
solution?
One FBI agent recommends the use of AI on social media platforms
to predict signs of imminent danger. 55 In 2017, the FBI’s National Center
for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) and Behavioral Threat
Assessment Center published findings of behavioral analytics of violent
persons. 56 The report states:
By engaging in the assessment and management
process as soon as a person of concern is identified, threat
managers are more likely to succeed in preventing a
violent outcome. Steering a person in a different direction
early on may mean offering assistance to someone who
needs it before that person concludes violence is
necessary. 57
Specifically, the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) mapped
certain traits and characteristics of individuals who have committed some
act of mass or extreme violence. 58 Recognizing there may be no exhaustive
list of such traits and characteristics, the report distinguishes “risk factors”
from “warning behaviors,” which, when combined, could predict potential
acts of violence. 59

Foreign Intelligence Amendments Act of 2008, 50 U.S.C § 1805(a) (2008).
Interview with Anonymous FBI Agent (Nov. 19, 2019) (on file with the author). The FBI
has in fact already explored AI’s policing capabilities. See, e.g., Robert Davidson, Automated
Threat Detection and the Future of Policing, LEB (Aug. 8, 2019)
https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/automated-threat-detection-and-the-future-ofpolicing [https://perma.cc/Y9RT-89XY].
See generally MOLLY AMMAN ET AL., FBI, MAKING PREVENTION A REALITY:
IDENTIFYING, ASSESSING, AND MANAGING THE THREAT OF TARGETED ATTACKS (2017),
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/making-prevention-a-reality.pdf/view
[https://perma.cc/Q7LA-TN4M].
Id. at 5.
Id. at 21 (“Threat assessment is a multifaceted process, stemming from a holistic analysis
of the pattern of behaviors displayed by a person of concern.”).
Id. at 29–32.
54
55

56

57
58

59
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Risk factors involve “existing realities about the person of concern
that may increase the risk of violence he poses in a given situation.” 60 Such
factors include violence exposure, mental health, weapon access,
problematic behavioral history, and social/environmental concerns. 61
Conversely, warning behaviors are “dynamic and represent changes in
patterns of behavior that may be evidence of increasing or accelerating
risk.” 62 Categorically, these behaviors include pathways to violence,
fixation, identity (i.e., taking on a pseudo-warrior identity), novel
aggression, energy burst, leakage (communicating intent to harm a third
person), directly communicated threats, approach (i.e., attempts to gain
access to, or surveillance of, a targeted location), end-of-life planning, and
last-resort behaviors. 63
Analyzing these behaviors allows the FBI to determine the threat
levels of various individuals. The FBI compares this threat assessment
system to the weather assessment system of the National Weather Service
(NWS). 64 For example, when monitoring tornadoes, the NWS uses
weather patterns to predict if conditions require: (i) no message, (ii) a
tornado watch, or (iii) a tornado warning. 65 When the chance of a tornado
is not “measurably above the base rate,” the NWS remains silent on
tornado updates (no message). 66 But when conditions are just right, the
NWS will alter its alert to either “watch” or “warning.” 67 Similarly, the
BAU adopts a similar structure to determine: (i) the appropriate level of
concern; and (ii) how imminent that concern may be. 68 The FBI’s report
states, “[a] concern level does not predict violence likelihood but rather
expresses the extent to which conditions may facilitate violence
potential.” 69
The report goes on to discuss the fact that many of these behaviors
are evidenced through social media and electronic communication. Social
media leakage, once located, “can be a very effective source of information
regarding the person’s mindset and future plans. Social media review

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. at 29.
Id. at 29–32.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 32–36.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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should begin as soon as a case is opened and continue until concerns are
abated.” 70
Behavioral analytics on social media accounts has already existed for
several years through the use of AI. 71 Today, it is commonly used to detect
advertising opportunities, 72 remove “hateful accounts,” 73 and even analyze
and predict terrorist recruiting and public relations behavior. 74
Integrating AI and the behavioral analytics already established at the
FBI could provide a non-content-based solution to targeting U.S. citizens.
If the FBI can integrate its current threat forecasting scheme into an AI
software, then Congress could grant the FBI the capabilities to target U.S.
persons based on that threat determination, rather than on the content of
that person’s conduct or speech. Such a red flag “warning” could provide
the FBI with a sufficient basis to secure a warrant for the target’s electronic
communications on that social media platform. 75 The idea is to provide
the FBI with proactive tools that constitutionally protect U.S. citizens from
other U.S. citizens.

Id. at 50. According to this report,
A study of targeted violence incidents at schools revealed that in over 75% of the cases studied
at least one person had information that the offense was being planned. Most were peers,
such as a friend, a schoolmate, or a sibling. Some peers knew about the plan because the
offender “leaked” it. Leakage on social media could take the form of writings, images, videos,
and even “likes.” An example of social media leakage occurred in a European case. Hours
before a 2011 assault on a youth camp, the offender posted a video online which appeared
to advocate violence toward specific religious and political groups. About 90 minutes before
his offense, he posted a 1,500+ page “manifesto” online, describing two years of preparation
for violence. It is worth noting that neither of these posts included a direct threat.

70

Id.
See Tina Shahid, Social Media AI: How Did the History of AI Lead Up to It?, SYNTHESIO
71

(Feb.
27,
2019),
https://www.synthesio.com/blog/social-media-ai-history-of-ai/
[https://perma.cc/94BE-HL82].
See 9series Solutions, The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Social Media, MYSTORY
(June 7, 2019), https://yourstory.com/mystory/the-impact-of-artificial-intelligence-on-socialme [https://perma.cc/J9PL-UQM9].
72

73

Id.

DANIEL ZENG ET AL., SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYTICS AND INTELLIGENCE 14 (IEEE Computer
Society,
2010),
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=5678581
[https://perma.cc/5DBP-VNK7].
This assumes no “public safety” exception would apply to the warrant requirement. See
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978) (stating “warrants are generally required . .
. unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling
that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable.”).
74

75
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2. Private Sector Participation
Section 702 mandates private companies, such as ISPs, to comply
with FISA requests for electronic communications. 76 The government
compensates these companies for their compliance and absolves them of
any liability that may result. 77 Finally, Section 702 provides these electronic
communication service providers with an opportunity to challenge such
intelligence directives under the Fourth Amendment. 78
This same structure can be applied to social media companies. For
example, this statute proposed in this article would include language
requiring social media companies to integrate AI software that is based on
the FBI’s preexisting behavioral indicators of imminent violence.
Essentially, this would automate and de-humanize the process of
determining threatening behavior. 79
Like Section 702, Congress should require the ongoing transfer of
“red flags” to the FBI. Using the NWS example above, when Facebook’s
“domestic terror AI” flags a person as a “tornado warning,” that signal
would be immediately available to the FBI for further investigation.
Additionally, the new statute should provide the same protections to social
media companies that Section 702 provides to electronic communications
companies. The FBI could compensate social media companies for the
cost of transferring and providing the data. It could also provide protection
from any civil liability arising from the data sharing.

3. Limited Timeframe
Under Section 702, an order permitting the DNI and AG to target
non-U.S. persons only survives for one year. 80 This limitation prevents
boundless and open surveillance on foreign persons by requiring the
agencies to maintain certifications of relevance on an annual basis. 81
Should Congress pass a statute mandating early AI detection, several
methods of time limitation arise. First, Congress could limit the “front
end” of the investigation. For example, once the FBI receives a “red flag
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1), (5) (2018).
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(2)–(3).
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(4), (6).
See K.A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make
Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 66 (2003) (“The automated analysis of
potentially relevant transactional data while shielding the exposure of individual identity to a
generalized search protects privacy by maintaining anonymity, which in turn preserves
autonomy.”).
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a).
50 U.S.C. § 1881b(b)(1)(F).
76
77
78
79

80
81
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warning” from a social media’s AI platform, the statute could limit how
long the FBI has to secure a warrant. This would prevent the FBI from
retroactively seeking a warrant from somebody who triggered a “warning”
status at a previous time, but currently no longer does. Second, the statute
could limit the “back end” of the investigation. This would limit a court
order allowing the FBI to investigate a suspect’s electronic
communications to a specific timeframe (e.g., one year, similar to Section
702 limitations).

4. Judicial Review
Section 702 provides judicial review for both the submitted
certifications for surveillance and the procedures used during the
investigation to ensure compliance with FISA. 82 Furthermore, Section 702
provides appeals processes to review the FISC’s initial determination. 83
Congress could similarly provide for judicial review of the FBI’s
certification through an Article III court and subject it to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. “Domestic terrorism,” while defined in a
criminal statute, carries no criminal penalties. 84 This is because, so far, all
acts of domestic terrorism have been covered by criminal law. 85
Consequently, Article III courts are adequate for reviewing the
constitutionality of a domestic surveillance search.
Additionally, Congress should grant the court jurisdiction over the
FBI’s domestic surveillance procedures, based on its authority granted
under Article III of the Constitution. Section 702 expressly enumerates
targeting, minimization, and querying procedures as subject to FISC
jurisdiction. 86 Similarly, Congress should outline the appropriate
procedures for targeting and minimization procedures for domestic
surveillance and subject those procedures to judicial review.
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j).
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(4).
18 U.S.C. § 2331(5). But see Barbara McQuade, Proposed Bills Would Help Combat
Domestic Terrorism, LAWFARE (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/proposedbills-would-help-combat-domestic-terrorism [https://perma.cc/UA2P-N7QC] (“[Proposed
legislation making domestic terrorism a crime] would provide much-needed tools to federal
agents and prosecutors who sometimes find themselves without adequate means for
addressing domestic terrorism.”).
See Robert Chesney, Should We Create a Federal Crime of “Domestic Terrorism”?,
LAWFARE (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/should-we-create-federal-crimedomestic-terrorism [https://perma.cc/K6XF-2DFE] (“We do not have a situation in which
persons who are involved in terrorist attacks somehow end up walking free, or getting
improperly light sentences, due to a gap in the scope or calibration of criminal laws.”).
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2).
82
83
84

85
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Conclusion

In summary, the language of Section 702 affords Congress a structure
utilizing limited surveillance measures to prevent acts of domestic
terrorism. If national leaders prioritized this issue over their political
safety, they would quickly learn there is room for both common sense
domestic safety policy and constitutional liberties.
Authorizing the FBI to access Section 702 data is likely a necessary,
yet insufficient, tool for solving the problem of domestic terrorism. The
concept of sharing such information raises questions of boundaries as to
constitutional and political limitations. Those limitations are addressed in
turn in the following sections.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE DOMESTIC USE OF
SECTION 702
James Manson leads an organization called the “Atomwaffen,” a
group Vox describes as a “particularly radical alt-right group . . . openly
encouraging supporters to plan and commit ‘lone wolf’ attacks on African
Americans, Jews, and other minority groups.” 87 Manson authored Siege, a
newsletter published between 1980 to 1986, urging his readers to engage
in “individual acts of violence,” which “could add up, destabilizing the
American political system and bringing on a race war.” 88
In 2015, Dylann Roof responded to Manson’s call for individual acts
of violence when he opened fire in a black church in Charleston, South
Carolina, killing nine people. 89 He did so with “the explicit intent of
sparking a ‘race war’ [in America].” 90 Two researchers at the AntiDefamation League have reported four examples of individuals motivated
by Roof to commit similar acts. 91 One of the individuals said that he
wanted to “pull a Dylann Roof,” and “make the news some more and

Zack Beauchamp, An Online Subculture Celebrating the Charleston Church Shooter
Appears to be Inspiring Copycat Plots, VOX (Feb. 7, 2019, 3:35 PM),

87

https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/2/7/18215634/dylann-roof-charlestonchurch-shooter-bowl-gang [https://perma.cc/YA3B-BFXT].
88
89
90
91

Id.
Id.
Id.
Hardcore White Supremacists Elevate Dylann Roof to Cult Hero Status, ANTI-

DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.adl.org/blog/hardcore-whitesupremacists-elevate-dylann-roof-to-cult-hero-status [https://perma.cc/RE42-2VZD].

1138

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:5

shoot some Jews.” 92 Permeating social media sites, Roof’s followers
(referred to as the Bowl Gang) spread continued calls to violence in the
name of the new “race war.” 93
This section identifies when these statements invoke presidential and
congressional war powers. Next, it examines constitutional protections
U.S. citizens maintain against those war powers. Specifically, this section
considers whether: (1) an automated AI alert to the FBI constitutes a
Fourth Amendment search; and (2) such threatening speech falls under
the First Amendment’s protection.

A. Limits on Constitutional Powers: War Powers
The Prize Cases provide perspective on these questions during the
Civil War. 94 While Congress recessed in 1861, President Lincoln ordered
a blockade of Southern ports after Southern forces attacked Fort
Sumpter. 95 Union forces then captured four neutral vessels that allegedly
violated the blockade. 96 The defendants argued they were mere
“insurgents” or “traitors” rather than “belligerents” or “enemies,”
proscribing the usual consequences of war. 97 The owners of these vessels
argued this conflict did not constitute traditional criteria for war, as the
conflict did not arise between nations. 98
The Court responded by clarifying that Article II vests the “whole
Executive power” in the Presidency. 99 The court interpreted that power as
not only licensing the President to respond to foreign threats but binding
him “to resist force by force," that is, “to accept the challenge without
waiting for any special legislative authority.” 100 Important for our purposes,
the Court clarified that “whether the hostile party be a foreign invader, or
States organized in rebellion, it is none the less a war, although the
declaration of it be ‘unilateral.’” 101 The Court also highlighted the fact that
Congress ratified President Lincoln’s actions, arguing such ratification
Beauchamp, supra note 87; see also Hardcore White Supremacists Elevate Dylann Roof
to Cult Hero Status, supra note 91.
92

93

Id.

94

The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862).

95

Id. at 637.
Id.
Id. at 667.
Id.
Id. at 668.
Id.
Id.

96
97
98
99
100
101
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supported the argument that “war” existed. Therefore, Lincoln’s actions
were constitutionally permitted. 102 Consequently, the Court deferred to the
President’s characterization of the conflict as a “civil war” and the
defendants as “belligerents” because this characterization was a “question
to be decided by him, and this Court must be governed by the decisions
and acts of the political department of the Government to which this
power was entrusted.” 103
The “War on Terror” follows the Prize Cases’ recipe for proscribing
war. Commentators have argued the presidential war powers and their
congressional ratification through the Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF) are limited because Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are not
traditional nation-state enemies. 104 But as other academics have noted, the
peculiarity of the war opponent has not prevented previous use of
presidential war powers. 105 The Mexican-American War, Civil War, and
Spanish-American War all required military engagement with military
opponents maintaining “no formal connection to the state enemy.” 106
Additionally, other past authorizations of force have been directed at nonmilitary officials or state actors “such as slave traders, pirates, and Indian
tribes.” 107
It follows, then, that Congress’ ability to declare war, and the
President’s ability to prosecute war, are not limited to traditional notions of
state actors engaged in open warfare against the United States. However,
does the Constitution permit executing such powers against U.S. citizens?
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court considered whether the war powers
of the Constitution could be applied against a United States citizen. 108
Specifically, the Court considered whether a United States citizen
maintained a right to habeas corpus despite his detainment as an enemy
combatant. There, the Court held that “[w]hatever power the United
102
103

See id. at 671 (noting Congress ratified the President’s action).
Id. at 670 (“The proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to the

Court that a state or war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a
measure, under the circumstances peculiar to the case.”).
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1032–34
(2004) (noting that “[t]he wars with Afghanistan and Iraq were wars; the struggle against
Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda is not.”); see also David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 953 (2002).
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2067 (2005).
104

105

106
107
108

Id.
Id. at 2066.
See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other
nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at
stake.” 109 Because of Hamdi’s U.S. citizenship and right to due process, the
Hamdi court refused to apply the Constitution’s war powers against the
defendant. 110
Hamdi stands for the proposition that even if Congress has
sanctioned the President to “resist force by force,” such force may not be
applied to a United States citizen without the courts’ involvement. 111
Therefore, to the extent domestic terrorism involves U.S. citizens, any
“force” against those citizens may not be granted without a blessing from
all three branches of government. 112 In other words, even if Congress
granted and the Executive approved some sort of force against domestic
terrorism, U.S. citizens are still entitled to due process. 113 While Congress
has not explicitly proscribed the intelligence community to war against
domestic terrorism, this backdrop informs the Constitutional limits on
congressional and executive war powers.
In light of the Prize Cases and Hamdi, it follows that the President
has the authority to “resist force by force”; however, when applied to U.S.
citizens, such force is subject to a court’s determination of due process.
Thus, if Congress decides to authorize the Executive to apply foreign
intelligence tools against U.S. citizens, that authorization must be subject to
judicial scrutiny.
As outlined above, by adopting Section 702’s judicial review
language, the statute proposed in this paper satisfies Hamdi’s required
judicial scrutiny. By providing both a “front-end” judicial review of the
FBI’s warrant request for electronic communications and a “back end”
Id. at 536. But see United States v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. Of Mich.,
Southern Division (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972) (“Implicit in [the President's War
Powers] duty is the power to protect our Government against those who would subvert or
overthrow it by unlawful means. In the discharge of this duty, the President—through the
Attorney General—may find it necessary to employ electronic surveillance to obtain
intelligence information on the plans of those who plot unlawful acts against the
Government.”).
Id. at 2651.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 581–83 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 535.
But see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 38 (discussing the legality of drone strikes
against U.S.-citizen terrorist, al-Aulaqi) (“Because al-Aulaqi is a U.S. citizen, the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as well as the Fourth Amendment, likely protects him
in some respects even while he is abroad.”).
109

110
111
112
113
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judicial review of the FBI’s procedures, a domestic version of Section 702
would provide extensive judicial scrutiny, preventing overreach of
presidential and congressional war powers.

B. Constitutional Liberties: First and Fourth Amendment
Considerations
United States v. United States District Court, otherwise known as the
“Keith case,” remains the leading authority on domestic surveillance. 114
Decided before the enactment of FISA, the Keith court refused to extend
a “national security” exception to the warrant requirement for domestic
surveillance.
1. Keith v. Proposed Domestic Terrorism Statute: Factual
Distinctions
Despite Keith’s assumed applicability to domestic surveillance
questions, its factual distinctions from current domestic terrorism compel
different legal conclusions concerning the scope of domestic surveillance.
First, Keith arose when U.S. citizens bombed a CIA office in Ann Arbor,
Michigan. 115 That is, Keith arose when U.S. citizens enacted violence
against their own government. In contrast, the domestic terrorism
currently imperiling the United States involves acts of violence targeting
innocent U.S. citizens. While subtle, this factual distinction impacts First
Amendment considerations.
Second, in Keith, the government wiretapped the defendants’
communications without a warrant. 116 There, the defendants’
communications were private phone conversations. 117 They were not
public communications. The statutory language suggested in this paper
would determine risks based on language and data placed into public
discourse.
Third, and perhaps most critically, Keith was decided before 9/11.
Consequently, Keith analyzed the FBI’s actions through a lens of
traditional law enforcement, rather than through the “prevention” lens
United States v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. Of Mich. (Keith) 407 U.S. 297
(1972); see Chesney, supra note 85 (“There has not been any significant appetite, since the
1970s, for crafting a purely domestic surveillance system along the lines the Supreme Court
suggested in the famous Keith case.”).
Keith, 407 U.S. at 299.
Id. at 300–01.
Id. at 299.

114

115
116
117
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established by the 9/11 Commission Report. 118 The proposed domestic
terrorism statute arises from the intelligence community’s new prevention
charge. While human rights are not subject to the changing needs of
government, the law makes clear that certain rights are abrogated by
certain actions (e.g., murder may deprive a citizen of her right to liberty, or
even life). The question here is whether public disregard for human life
can create a legal basis for the government to engage in preventive
measures.

2. Fourth Amendment Distinctions
These factual distinctions compel different legal conclusions. First,
the government's actions in Keith clearly constituted a “search,” whereas
the surveillance proposed in this paper would not. Second, even if the
proposed amendment constituted a search, post-Keith Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has provided applicable exceptions to the
warrant requirement.
To begin, while the government’s actions in Keith clearly constitute a
Fourth Amendment “search,” the proposed amendment does not. Only
six years before Keith, Katz v. United States ruled that federal wiretaps of
phone conversations violated the Fourth Amendment. 119 Before Katz, the
legal test for whether a search had occurred was whether the government
physically trespassed onto a person’s “constitutionally protected area.” 120
Katz transitioned the test to consider whether the government violated a
person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” 121 In 2012, United States v.
Jones held that both tests are appropriate for determining whether a
Fourth Amendment search occurred. 122
However, subsequent cases have held that government intrusions on
social media sites do not constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. In 2011, the City of New York charged Malcom Harris with
disorderly conduct for his involvement in “Occupy Wall Street.” There,
the court held “[t]here can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in a
THOMAS H. KEAN & LEE HAMILTON, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 364 (Authorized
ed. 2004).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“The Government’s activities in
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon
which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and
seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
See id. at 352 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464, 466 (1928)).
Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012).

118

119

120
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tweet sent around the world. . . . So long as the third party is in possession
of the materials, the court may issue an order for the materials from the
third party when the materials are relevant and evidentiary.” 123 The court
for the U.S. District of Georgia followed suit in a case involving Facebook,
holding “[the defendant] fails to acknowledge the lack of privacy afforded
her by her selected Facebook setting. While [defendant] may select her
Facebook friends, she cannot select her Facebook friends’ friends . . .
[making] her page available to potentially hundreds, if not thousands, of
people whom she did not know.” 124
The proposed statute does not suggest that the FBI should monitor
all social media profiles for clues of criminal activity. Rather, the statute
merely proposes public-private partnerships that alert the FBI to
conditions ripe for violence. These alerts are rooted in behavioral analytics
the FBI already uses to determine violence and the imminence thereof.
Further, these alerts are used for preventive, not prosecutorial, evidencegathering purposes. The alerts merely provide a proactive means to alert
the FBI to potential dangers, causing warrants to be obtained sooner than
they otherwise may have been able to.
Second, even if an AI alerting system constituted a “search,” it falls
within the “public safety” exception to the warrant requirement. Keith held
the government’s domestic surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment
because judicial approval occurred after the surveillance already occurred.
The government argued that a “special circumstances” exception should
be applied to the warrant requirement, given the distinctions between
“domestic security” and criminal cases. 125 The Court rejected this
argument, holding:
The circumstances described do not justify complete
exemption of domestic security surveillance from prior
judicial scrutiny. Official surveillance, whether its purpose
be criminal investigation or ongoing intelligence gathering,
risks infringement of constitutionally protected privacy of
speech. Security surveillances are especially sensitive
because of the inherent vagueness of the domestic security
concept, the necessarily broad and continuing nature of
intelligence gathering, and the temptation to utilize such
People v. Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590, 593–94 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2012) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703[d]; People v. Carassavas, 426 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Saratoga Cty. Ct. 1980)).
Chaney v. Fayette Cty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2013).
United States v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. Of Mich. (Keith), 407 U.S.
297, 318–19 (1972).
123

124
125
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surveillances to oversee political dissent. 126
Admittedly, not until the 1978 Mincey v. Arizona decision (six years
after Keith) did the U.S. Supreme Court expand the “exigent
circumstance” warrant exception to include public safety. 127 However,
Mincey adopted a 1969 case from the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia to expand the exception, which would have been available to
Keith as well. 128 Regardless, Keith only recognized a limited number of
exceptions to the warrant requirement: “[searches that] serve the legitimate
needs of law enforcement officers to protect their own well-being and
preserve evidence from destruction.” 129 “Public safety” provides the very
basis for the proposed statute. Falling squarely within the language of
Mincey, the proposed amendment provides proactive alerts to the FBI of
conditions that threaten public safety. Therefore, no warrant should be
necessary for the AI alerts.
To suggest Keith forecloses any opportunity to conduct domestic
surveillance based on a domestic version of Section 702 is to
misunderstand the aforementioned factual and legal distinctions between
Keith and the proposed statute. Keith’s holding may make sense in light of
the government’s surveillance involved there; however, it fails to reach a
domestic version of Section 702 that would target U.S. citizens based on
warning indicators arising from public social media posts. Keith left the
door open for Congress to apply surveillance techniques against “domestic
security” that differ from those used in traditional criminal law:
Given those potential distinctions between Title III
criminal surveillances and those involving the domestic
security, Congress may wish to consider protective
standards for the latter which differ from those already
prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. Different
standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment
if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need
of Government for intelligence information and the
protected rights of our citizens. 130

126
127

Id. at 320.
See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (citing Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d

205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1969)) (“The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is
justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.”).
Id. (adopting Wayne, 318 F.2d at 212).
Keith, 407 U.S. at 318.
Id. at 322–23.
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Based on the foregoing, the domestic version of Section 702, as
outlined in this paper, would reasonably relate to the “legitimate need of
Government for intelligence” and the “protected rights of our citizens.”

3. First Amendment Distinctions
As the court explained in Keith, “National security cases, moreover,
often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not
present in cases of ‘ordinary’ crime.” 131 Justice Powell cited Senator Gary
Hart’s speech, expressing First Amendment concerns with domestic
surveillance in the name of national security:
As I read it—and this is my fear—we are saying that
the President, on his motion, could declare—name your
favorite poison—draft dodgers, Black Muslims, the Ku
Klux Klan, or civil rights activists to be a clear and present
danger to the structure or existence of the Government. 132
As the Keith court went on to say, “The price of lawful public dissent
must not be a dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power.
Nor must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous
citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private
conversation.” 133
The FBI addressed this concern in its 2017 Behavior Analysis Unit
report. 134 Specifically, the report concludes: “As a threat assessment
strategy, monitoring a person of concern’s communications is sometimes
recommended; these may include publicly accessible social media or
weblog (‘blog’) posts.” 135 As the report highlights, however, the
constitutional right to free speech does not extend to all forms of
expression. 136 Particularly, the FBI points out “true threats” as a form of
unprotected speech. 137 The report defines a “true threat” as intending “to
communicate a serious expression of intent to commit unlawful violence

131
132

Id. at 313.
Id. at 314 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 14750) (statement of Sen. Hart) (“The subsequent

assurances, quoted in part I of the opinion, that § 2511(3) implied no statutory grant,
contraction, or definition of presidential power eased the Senator’s misgivings.”).
133
134
135
136
137

Id.
See AMMAN, supra note 56, at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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against an individual or group; he need not intend to carry out the
threat.” 138
The report also recognizes the FBI must have “authorized purposes”
for monitoring someone’s speech. One authorized purpose is “trying to
determine whether a person is exhibiting behaviors that pose a concern for
significant and imminent violence.” 139 It follows that using AI to monitor
conditions for “significant and imminent” violence falls within First
Amendment boundaries. Such a tool removes the FBI from “monitoring”
speech. Rather, it informs the FBI, based on its own behavior analytics
already in place, of early threats. It screens surveillance from being
unequally applied based on political dissent or persuasion. Instead, the
proposed language allows an objective “third party” to detect conditions
ripe for concern, based on science-based factors of violence.

Conclusion
In summary, the proposed statute stands on all fours within
constitutional limits on the executive branch and individual liberties.
Additionally, the proposal is completely on point with balancing individual
liberties and public safety. While Keith necessarily governs the limits on
domestic surveillance, it explicitly leaves open the possibility for the type
of surveillance considered here.
IV. UNDERCURRENTS IN COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY
Despite the constitutionality of this article’s proposal, the
fearmongering of politics will likely defeat it. One commentator notes that
while he has “not seen anyone calling for an attempt to create a
domestically focused analogue to . . . something akin to Section 702,” such
a proposal could “pass constitutional muster according to . . . Keith,” but
“smacks of authoritarianism.” 140 The commentator correctly identifies
political concerns over appearing “authoritarian.” However, this provides a
mere cursory explanation of the political concern. Instead, competing
policy perspectives have arguably created three specific “tensions”
surrounding questions of domestic terrorism in the intelligence
community.
These tensions have confused and ultimately frustrated sound policy
developments to address domestic terrorism. First, legal distinctions
between foreign and domestic terrorism fail to reflect their factual
138
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Id. (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (emphasis added).
Id. at 20.
See Chesney, supra note 85.
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similarities. Second, after 9/11, the intelligence community faces new
pressures to prevent atrocities, rather than merely prosecute those who
commit them. Finally, inter-agency information sharing after 9/11 pulls
domestic resources into international counterterrorism, without
reciprocation.

A. Foreign/Domestic Terrorism Distinctions
First, legal distinctions between foreign and domestic terrorism fail to
reflect their factual similarities. On the one hand, these distinctions make
sense. Most obviously, foreign terrorism often (though certainly not
always) involves non-U.S. citizens. Thus, any counterterrorism efforts are
limited by statutory rights afforded to non-U.S. persons—not by the
Constitution. This was especially obvious during questions of habeas
corpus, detention, torture, and military tribunals.
Additionally, foreign acts of terror invoke different laws than acts of
domestic terror. Foreign terrorism can implicate any number of
international or humanitarian laws. Conversely, domestic terrorism
involves acts usually criminalized by federal or state law. 141
On the other hand, there are a few factual distinctions between
foreign and domestic terrorism. Both involve acts of violence in the name
of a higher call or mission. Both represent extremities in their higher call.
Both draw significant attention due to the extensive damages and deaths
they often create. Former FBI special agent Ali Soufan summarized this
tension:
America’s law enforcement agencies, intelligence
community and court system all treat these two scenarios
differently. Those differences in treatment mask instructive
similarities between these two forms of organized hate.
Having spent almost 25 years fighting jihadi terrorism here
and abroad, I see disturbing parallels between the rise of
Al Qaeda in the 1990s and that of racist terrorism today. 142
The degree of legal separation assumes a degree of factual distinction
that does not exist between foreign and domestic terrorism. Consequently,
policymakers hesitate to narrow the legal distinctions for fear of public
See Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” and “International”
Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1339 (2019).
Ali H. Soufan, I Spent 25 Years Fighting Jihadis. White Supremacists Aren’t So Different.
141
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N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/opinion/white-supremacyterrorism.html [https://perma.cc/V89D-KRX9].
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scrutiny or constitutional intrusions. In sum, this fear prevents the pursuit
of effective reform.

B. From Prosecution to Prevention
Second, after 9/11, the intelligence community faces new pressures to

prevent atrocities, rather than merely prosecute those who commit them.

In the 9/11 Commission Report, the Commission argues future
intelligence efforts “should be accompanied by a preventive strategy that is
as much, or more, political as it is military.” 143
The intelligence community’s renewed focus on prevention
expanded to the FBI—a new focus for an organization that traditionally
sees itself as a law enforcement agency. In 2004, then-FBI Director Robert
Mueller summarized this shift:
Nearly a century ago, the FBI was created to
investigate criminal activity that had begun to cross county
and state lines . . . . Immediately following 9/11, the FBI’s
number one priority became the prevention of terrorist
attacks. This required a systematic approach examining all
aspects of Bureau operations . . . . [including] how we
disseminate our intelligence information. 144
Four years after 9/11, the Los Angeles Times published an article
titled, Go on the Offensive Against Terror. 145 Calling for expansive
intelligence efforts and the renewal of the USA PATRIOT Act, the article
reflects a shift in American expectations on its intelligence community: do
not just find the bad guys; keep them from ever doing this again.
Failure to recognize this shift in the intelligence community frustrates
reasonable surveillance policy discussions. If we understood that some
surveillance was used to prevent harm rather than criminalize behavior, we
might be more comfortable with discussing reasonable solutions.

KEAN & HAMILTON, supra note 118, at 364.
Robert S. Mueller III, FBI Director, Speaker at the Kansas State University Landon
Lecture
Series
(Apr.
13,
2004),
https://www.kstate.edu/media/newsreleases/landonlect/muellertext404.html [https://perma.cc/7WWK4X6X].
John Yoo, Go on the Offensive Against Terror, L.A. TIMES, (July 13, 2005),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-jul-13-oe-yoo13-story.html
[https://perma.cc/995C-NWVE].
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C. Foreign Tools Unavailable for Domestic Terrorism
Finally, inter-agency information sharing after 9/11 pulls domestic
resources into international counterterrorism, without reciprocation.
According to former FBI Director Mueller, “Today, criminal and terrorist
threats increasingly have [] international dimension[s]. . . . By September
11, 2001, we knew the world . . . was growing smaller and more
interconnected in an evolving crime landscape.” 146 Consequently, as
Mueller summarizes, “The age of global threats has moved the Bureau
into an age of global partnerships.” 147
But as the threat pendulum swings back to domestic terrorism, tools
available to fight against international terrorism have not been available to
the FBI for a similar threat. Currently, the intelligence community enjoys
legal latitude to deploy a series of tools against foreign terrorism. As stated
in the introduction of this paper, material support statutes, drone strikes,
and enhanced interrogation are all afforded to the foreign intelligence
community.
Post 9/11, some efforts to erode the “wall” between intelligence and
criminal agencies have helped. For example, in 2001, President Bush’s
Justice Department reformed FISA to make foreign intelligence only “a
purpose” of a FISA application, rather than “the purpose.” 148 While such
steps reflect a willingness to support the FBI’s efforts, the intelligence
community still preserves many institutional structures to resolve
immediate problems. For example, the FBI’s FISA request may take up to
four months to be approved. 149 Furthermore, the request must still involve
foreign intelligence, prohibiting FBI surveillance on individuals like
Dakota Reed who threaten shootings at local schools. In sum, the
Constitution allows for significant progress to be had in inter-agency
communication and information sharing.
V. CONCLUSION: TEAR DOWN THE WALL
On September 11, 2001, the entire United States felt the smoke and
debris that hovered over New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington D.C.
The intelligence community stood stunned, wondering what it had missed.
As reports of Massoui, Hazmi, and Mihdhar came to light, the intelligence
See Mueller, supra note 144.
Id.
See Inspector General Report, A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information
Related to the September 11 Attacks (June 2006).
Interview with Anonymous FBI Agent, supra note 55.
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community faced the sickening reality that the “wall” between intelligence
and criminal agencies provided terrorists with institutional support.
But, if you ask the average citizen on the street what concerns them
more: a foreign terrorist attack or a private citizen going rogue most would
likely express fear of a domestic attack. 150 In the wake of the El Paso and
Dayton shootings, President Trump promised, “We can and will stop this
evil contagion.” 151 He directed the FBI to identify the necessary tools and
said he would provide them with “whatever they need.” “We must shine
light on the dark recesses of the Internet and stop mass murders before
they start,” President Trump said. 152
While imperfect, the proposal in this paper may merely spark a
discussion concerning what foreign tools could be constitutionally applied
to domestic terrorism and be effective to that end. It provides a
constitutional framework for preventive action while respecting civil
liberties. If politics be its demise, I only hope that in the process, this
proposal inspires conversations that support both our safety and individual
freedoms.

See Vera Bergengruen & W.J. Hennigan, “We Are Being Eaten from Within.” Why
America Is Losing the Battle Against White Nationalist Terrorism, TIME MAG. (Aug. 8,
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https://time.com/5647304/white-nationalist-terrorism-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/3BXV-RJAD] (“White supremacy is a greater threat than international
terrorism right now.”).
Donald Trump, President of the United States, Remarks by President Trump on the Mass
Shootings in Texas and Ohio (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-mass-shootings-texas-ohio [https://perma.cc/6WZFXE56].
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